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ABSTRACT

•
Th1s thes1s represents an 1nvest1gat1on 1nto the mean1ng
and development of freedom 1n the ph1losophy of Mart1n He1degger.

is defined both as a finite, thrown be1ng-in-the-world

Part I deals pr1mar1ly w1th Se1n und Ze1t. , Dase1n, human reality,

and as a tree ent1ty, projecting its possibilities.

Dasein

aoh1eves authenticity in the renunoiation ot the orowd and by
embraoing its ult1mate poss1bility--death.

The oonolusion to

Part I argues tor the ident1 ty, in Heidegger l s though·t , of
finite freedom and temporality.
Part II deals with Gelassenhe1t, a work of Heidegger1s
latter period.

Freedom is expressed 1n a new vocabulary.

Man

must release himself but the 1nitiative in the freedom prooess
is no longer with Dase1n but with Be1ng.

The Critique, wh10h

conoludes the paper, sees the latter Heidegger as an attempt
to transoend the temporal hor1zon 1mposed by Kant.

INTRODUCTION
Martln Heldegger1 was orlglnally motlvated ln phllosophy wlth the read1ng of Franz Brentano's ~ !h! Manni~ Sense 2! Belng 1n Aristotle. 2 Thls work polnted
out the amblgult1es in the Arlstotellan use of the word
"belng".

Heldegger medltated thls book and beoame oon-

vlnoed that the problem of belng must be rethought.

Thls

oonvlotlon lnsplred the wrlttng of hls ohef d'oeuvre,
Seln
Zeit. J It was to be a reposlng of the questlon
about the meanlng of belng. The answer to the belngund

questlon was to be sought ln an analysls of human rea11ty
(Daseln) oarrled out ln the phenomenologloal tradltlon of
Husserl, the frlend and teaoher of Heldegger.
Heldegger's
dlvlslons.

projeo~ed

work was to oonsist of two major

The Flrst Half was to oontaln (1) a

~oundatlon

al analysls of Daseln, wlth (2) a defense of the thesls
that Daseln's meaning was Care, and that (J) any questlon
about the meanlng of belng must take lnto aooount Temporallty.
~

.

The Seoond Half was to oontaln an analysls of the

1Martln Heldegger was born ln 1898
'
ln Messklroh, Germany.
After a brief enoounter wlth -theologloal studies, he began to pursue phllosophy, eventually oomlng under the
lnfluenoe of Edmund Husserl at Freiburg.
Zvon der Mannlgfaohen Bedeutung des Selenden naoh
ArrstOteies; Frelburg, 1862.
--_ ----

J Seln ~~, Tueblngena N1emeyer, 196J. (abbrevlatedsSZ)

2

phllosophers Kant. Desoartes. and Arlstotle and an exposl tlon of thelr alleged mlsoonoeptl.ons of the be1ngquestlon.

OnlJ the flrst two seotlons of the First Half

were published.
Heidegger1s method was the phenomenology of Husserl.
It professed to be an intuition of essenoes whioh penetrated the layers of philosophioal prejudioe to arrive
at reality,. the phenomenon itself.
menologlst was the appearance.

Truth f or the pheno-

No metaphysioal theory

oould substitute for the oareful analysis of what appeared.
The task of the philosopher was aoourately to lntuit and
desoribe the phenomenon as lt presented itself ln oonsoiousness.
terminology.

~ ~ ~

abounds with phenomenolog1cal

Being is said to disolose itself. to oome

to light. to appear in the l1ght of its presence. etc.
The difficulty of read1ng Heidegger is legendary.
Even nat1ve German readers have been known to despa1r.

4

Heidegger. a gifted linguist. oreates a novel vooabulary
for the expression of his ldeas.

Neologisms abound as do

revivals of obsolete words and phrases.

This ls not

pedantry; Heideggerbelieves that phenomena are likely to
stand out in better relief when desor1bed in an unoonventional vocabulary.
All commentators agree that atter 19;0 Heidegger's

4ct •

Translators Pretaoe to Maoquarie and Robinson verslon
of Being 2 .'!1!!!..

• I

•

writings begin to show a new direotion.
ohange, for instanoe, between

There is a marked

~ ~ ~

and the essays

on Truth and Metaphysios whioh follow after only a few
years.

This ohange effeots both style and oontent.

I

intend to explore the depth of this evolution in Heideggerls
thought espeoially in 'r egard to freedom.
Freedom is my oentral theme.

I propose the following

two questions for solution in this paper.

(2) How does the presentation of freedom in Gelassen(1) What is the meaning of freedom in Se1n und Zeit?
he1t S differ from the above?

-

I have ohosen Gelassenheit for two reasons.
book is ,primarily ooncerned wi th freedom.

First, the
Seoondly, the

work is an exoellent example of Heideggerls latter writing.
The soope of this paper is, then, an investigation
into the

meanin~

and development of freedom with1n the

ph1losophy ot He1degger.

A broader study of the plaoe of

He1degger 1n the history ot the problem of freedom would
be of muoh value but beyond my present oonoern .

The body of the paper w1ll be primarily exposit1ve.
In Part One my task w1ll ' ',b e to isolate the prinoiple ideas

Care, Death, Resolve,

of Se1n und Ze1t (Dasein and 1ts World, the Ex1stentials,
and Temporal1ty) and to explore their

relevanoe for the development of He1degger 1 s understand1ng
5Gelassenhe1t, Pful11ngenl Neska, 1954. (abbrev1ated. G)

'-
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of Freedom.

In Part Two, I w111 present an expo$1t1on

of the development of gelassenhe1t.s doctr1ne of freedom
over that of the early per1od.

The oonolusions to Parts

One and Two will seek to answer the quest10ns proposed
earlier in this Introduction

.

bY the defense of two theses.

The first thesis regards the 1dentifioation of freedom" and
The seoond has referenoe to the
source of freedom in Gelassenheit.
time in Se1n und Zeit.

The final section of the paper will be a Critique of
Heidegger's thought on freedom.

This orit1oal appraisal

will be carried out (1) by a olarifioation of one way in
which Heidegger has advanoed over the traditional concept
of freedom, and (2) by some remarks on Heidegger's overooming ot the temporal horizon imposed bJ Kant.

PART ONE

SIIN OND ZEIT

CHAPTER I
DASEIN THE FREE
The concept ot Daseln1 provldes us wlth a profltable
startlng place for our study of treedom ln Heldegger.
Llterally Dasein means "to be there".

It ls not, as often

1

thought, a neologlsm of Heldegger but appears ln phllosophical German with the meaning of presence or exlstence.
Heldegger's use ls, however, unique.

Dasein 1s tor him

the human phenomenon.
Dasein ls the ,"there" ot Belng.

It is the place

where Being appears or., to use more Heideggerian language.
lt is the occaslon for the presence of Being.

Heidegger

sees Dasein as a kind of rupture or break in present-tohand reality.2

"Auf dem Grunde des Seinsverstaendnlsses

1st der Mensch das Da, mit dessen Sein der eroefrnende
Einbruch in das Selende geschieht •••• " (SZ p. 206)
This is our first indication of the freedom of Dasein.
lSeveral excellent translations of Dasein have been offered.
Perhaps the most llterary is that of de Whaelens:
"l'existence humaine lt • (f:! Phi~Phie de Martin Heidegger.
p . 27) Richardson prefers the litera "there-being".
(Heidegger, p. 44) In this paper I have chosen to retaln
the German. Moreover, since the term is becoming common
ln phllosophlcal dlscussions ln Engllsh, I w1l1 omlt the
underllne.
2Th1s term refers to that reality which is not Dasein.
Heidegger derives hls term present-to-hand in hls discussion ot eqUipment. When a tool fails to function it
dlscloses itself as merely present-to-hand, 1.e. outside
any meaningful context.

,

7

•

It 1s not c1rcumscr1bed by the determ1nlsm whlch character1zes present-to-hand reallty.

Indeed, 1t ls a rupture ln

the world ot the present-to-hand which ls an open1ng tor
the appearance ot Belng.

B.J namlng man the "there" of Belng Heldegger wlshes to
convey h1s 1dentlf1cat1on ot Belng

(~)

and DB-seln.

There 1s 1n Heldegger no ontologlcal dlstlnctlon between
the two.

The tundamental . ontolog1cal dlfferenoe ls between

~ ~d

Dase1n on the one hand and present-to-hand reallty

on the other.

One of the reasons for Heldegger's deslre to

avold the ontolog1cal dlstlnct10n between ...........
Seln and Daseln
ls h1s 1ntentlon to overcome the subject-object dlchotomy
In the phllosophy ot

whlch has plagued ph1losophy.

He1degger one does not f1nd a knownlng subject stand1ng
vls a v1s
them.

an

object and the oonsequent problems of un1tlng

He has gone beyond th1s d1st1nct1on and avoided the

problems lt enta1ls.

/

He1degger understands Dase1n as that entlty whose
essenoe 1s 1ts ex1stence.

It 1s that Belng whose whatness

(Soseln) 1s lts aot ot ex1stlng (Exlstenz).J

The ram1-

floatlons of thls for freedom are tar reaohing.

Dase1n's

essence ls to exlst, to become, to oomplete ltself.
lts own poss1b1l1ty of self-aoh1evement.

It 1s

It 1s lncorreot,

therefore, to thlnk ot Dase1n as a statl0 being, devold

JIn

classlcal med1eval phllosophy ex1stence (esse) was
attr1buted to only one essenoe, God.

•

8

of the freedom to develop.

It ls on these grounds that

Heldegger crltlo1zes Arlstotle's deflnltlon of man as
anthropos logon echon.

Man ls, aocordlng to Arlstotle,

thls thlng or substance to whlch ratlonallty ls added.
For Heldegger, however, man ls not a substanoe but the
treedom to become.
Daher drueckt der Tltel "Dasein", mit dem wir
dieses Selende· bezeiohnen, nicht sein Was aus,
wie Tisoh, Haus, Baum, sondern das Seine (SZ, p.42)
If Daseln accepts the responslblllty of lts freedom
lt llves authentlcally.4

But lt can also abdicate thls

responslbll1ty, deny lts freedom and exlst lnauthentlcally.

Indeed, every Daseln llves much of lts llfe ln

lnauthentlolty.

This ls beoause of lts "everydayness".

(alltaegllohe Indlfferenz, SZ. p. 43) Daseln ls, as lt
were, .&uspended between the call to freedom and the
temptatlon to surrender ltself to the tranqulllzatlon
of "everydayness".
In the !2! Wesen

~

.W_a.h_r.h_e_l.t this amblvalence will

be expressed ln terms of Dasein's dwelling in truth and

un-truth.

t'Das Daseln ist, well wesenhaft verfallend,

selner Seinsverfassung nach in der Unwahrhelt ..... 5
4Heidegger's'
Rather than
carries the
one's own.
cally.

word for authentioity is Eigenlichkeit.
genuineness and similar conoepts thls word
thrust of the original Greek for authenticlty.
I am uniquely myself when I live authenti.

Svom Wesen der Wahrhelt, Frankfurt, Kloster.man, 1943.

page 22. -

•
9
Th1s paper w1ll oooasionally use the term un-freedom.
Although to

my

knowledge th1s term does not appear 1n

He1degger it is a convenient phrase for expressing the
renunoiation of treedom 1n inauthenticity.

For although

Dasein is called to authentlcity, it oannot live continIt is ot the essenoe of Dasein to

ually in this state.
fall 1nto un-freedom.

One further observation will help to clarify He1degger's
.understanding of Dasein.

We must be caretul to avoid

any

identification of Dasein with the knowing egos of Kant
and Husserl.

Heidegger has attempted to move the realist-

1dealist controversy to another battle ground by positing
a relationsh1p which is prior to any knower and known object.

I

Sinoe there is no ontological distinction between

Sein and
...........

Dasein, there is no need of the type of synthesis

Kant desoribes in his Transcendental Apperception.
Moreover Dasein does not relate to its world by forming oonoepts of it.

Dasein is basically pre-ontologioal.

The relationship ot

~

conceptualizat1on.

Man is aware of Be1ng before there is

and Dasein takes place before

any structural formulation of th1s awareness.

This is

strongly reminiscent ot the Augustin1an-Scotistic tradition
of intUitionism.

6

°Heidegger's dissertation tor Habilitation at Freiburg
was on Duns Scotus. (Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre
des Duns Scotus, 1915).

10

Heidegger expresses this pre-ontological grasp of
Being in the phenomenological term "being-in".

It is be-

oause of being-in that we can speak of suoh a thing as
a lumen naturale.
Die ontisch bildliche Hede Yom lumen naturale
im Menschen meint nichts anderes als die existenzialontologische Struktur dieses Seienden,
dass es ist in der Weise, sein DB zu seine Es
ist "erleuchtet". besagt: an ihm selbst als
In-der-Welt-sein geliohtet, • • • (SZ, p. 133)
Being-in will take on more olarity in the next chapter
as the problem of the world and its relationship to free
dom is dealt with.

CHAPTER II
FREEDOM-THE CONDITION FOR A WORLD
~h1s

chapter w111

1nvest1~t8

1n prov1d1ng Dase1n w1th a world.

the role of freedom
Dase1n 1s 1n 1ts world.

But th1s 1s not the "1n" of a temporal-spat1al 1nsert1on.
Nor 1s 1t the "1n" of a conoeptual knowledge ·of the world.
Dasein knows its world through the intelleotual power whioh
the Greeks named eidos after an analogy with visual peroeption.

But th1s. for Heidegger, 1s not the pr1mal re-

lationship.

Dase1n's fundamental relat1onsh1p to the world

1s a pre-oonoeptual awareness which Heidegger oalls be1ngin.

"Erkennen ist ein Se1nsmodus des Dase1ns als In-der-

Welt-se1n. es hat seine ontische Fundierung in dieser
Seinsverfassung.

(SZ, p. 61)

The difference between knowing the world, 1n the sense
of having a oonoept about 1t, 'and the more bas10 exper1ence
of being-1n oan be descr1bed in terms of tak1ng up a position relat1ve to the known object.

A seeing (1de1n) 1n-

volves a subjeot-objeot relat10nship and a confrontat1on of
a thing peroe1ved v1s a vis the peroeptual faoulty.

Dase1n

oan more properly be sa1d -to take part, from the 1ns1de, as
it were, 1n the entity that 1s understood.

Th1s type of

relationsh1p is poss1ble only in a free being.

Dasein is

not oonstra1ned to • mere "looking at" the world but is
allowed to parti01pate 1n it.

, ,

12

Heidegger · distinguishes four usages of the word "wor1d".1
(1) It oan designate that totality of things present-tohand.

(2) The world oan be used metaphysically as the

being of number one.

()

(worin) Dasein dwells.

World oan be used as the wherein
(4) It can des igna te the me.t aphys i-

oal oonoept which corresponds to number three.

Heidegger

will limit his use of the term to the third sense.
has its environment (umwelt).

Dasein

But unlike the environment

of the animal, Dasein's world oonsists in a totality of
innumerable and interdependent'meaningful relationships.
Dasein is aware of . these relationships before they are .
struotured in oonoepts.

Each object in the world bears a

.relationship to many other objeots that pinpoint it in a
meaningful context.
spreohend immer

QUS

"Zeug ist seiner Zeughaftigkeit

e~t

der Zugehoerigkeit zu anderem Zeug ••••

(8Z. p. 68)
This complex system of identification is indicative
of the presence of freedom.

Dasein combines old meanings

to form new ones, thereby producing progress in human

.

knowledge.

Creativity is the mark of that entity whose

meaningful world is not statio and determined but free
lHeidegger's concept of world, although quite original,
is nevertntsless the outgrowth of ::~his association with
Husser1. The influence of the latter Husserl, espeoia1ly
the Lebenswelt seotions of the unpublished manuscripts,
is f e1 t here, as 1·t; is in the wri tings of Me rleau-Ponty •
(of. dpi~f!)~l~rt!.· , p. lSY. VOJ.. I)

I
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and dynamio.
This totality of meaningful relationships which is
my world only appears when something happens to interrupt

its smooth funotion.

If a hammer were to break down during

use it would stand out as this thing that no longer fits
into JlJ7 world.
In solchem Entdeoken der Unverwendbarkeit
faellt das Zeug auf. (SZ, p. 73)
••• es zeigt sich als Zeugding, das so und so
aussieht und in seiner Zuhandenheit als so
aussehendes staendig auoh vorhanden war. (SZ, p. 73)
Die Umsicht stoesst ins Leere und sient erst
jetzt, wofuer und womit das Fehlende zuhanden
war. (SZ, . p. 75)
The upshot of the entire discussion of signs and references which comprfses several sections of Chapter III
of

~ ~ ~

is that besides the objects of our aware-

ness, there is an area in whioh they are enoountered.
Husserl referred to this as horizon.

The horizon is not

itself a thing of our oonsoiousness but without it the known
objeot would be impossible.
in the sense that it lets

The horizon is eminently free

the .~bjeots

of the world stand

out in their truth, that is to say, it allows them to be
themselves.
Dieses, woraufhin umweltlich Zuhandenes freigegeben
ist, so zwar" dass dieses allererst als innerweltliohes Selendes zugaenglioh wird, kann selbst
nioht als Seiendes dieser entdeokten Seinart begriffen werden. (SZ. p. 85)

14

The horizon ot understanding has for Heidegger both
an active and passive aspect.

The active aspeot will be

disoussed when the existential Projeotion is treated.
(cf. Chapter III)

The passive aspeot is the freedom by

whioh Dasein lets the world appear in its truth.

This is

reminiscent Qf the phenomenologioal method of Husserl who
constantly enoourages us to return to the things themselves.
We must avoid prejudioes and unjustified expectations as
-we investigate phenomena.

They must be allowed to be what

they are. to appear in their original and primal truth.
It is ln thls sense that we can speak of an openness or
freedom by whloh Dasein releases the objeot.
Bewendenlassen bedeutet ontisch: lnnerhalb
elnes faktisohen Besorgens ein Zuhandenes so
und so seln lassen, w1e es nunmehr 1st und
damlt es 80 1st. (SZ, p. 84)

CHAPTER III
OASEIN AS FREE ANO FINITE
In d1soover1ng 1ts world through be1ng-1n. Dase1n
d1soovers 1tself.

~hese

d1soover1es are not 1deas wh10h

Dase1n forms about itself and 1ts env1ronment but rather
unstruotured. preontolog10al revelat10ns of ex1stent1al
s1tuat1ons.

In th1s ohapter I w1ll exam1ne the three bas10

ways 1n wh10h Oase1n 1s 1n 1ts world.
Oase1n's ex1stent1al oonst1tut1on.

He1degger oalls th1s

These modes of be1ng-

1n w1ll reveal Dase1n as a f1n1tely tree ent1ty.
Dase1n's modes of be1ng-1n are not propert1es wh1ch
Dase1n has but rather fundamental modes of ex1stenoe.
Dase1n's ex1stenoe then 1s not s1mple but complex.
1nvolves a threefold manner of be1ng.
equiprimord1al-

~hey

It

But these modes are

are all on the same level of reality

and it is the most bas1c one poss1ble.

" ••• d1e Charaktere

sind n10ht Eigensohaften eines Vorhandenen. sondern wesenhaft ex1stenz1ale We1sen zu Se1n." (SZ. p. 133)
The f1rst of the three ex1stent1al oonst1tuents of
Dase1n 1s D1spos1tio~ (Bef1nd11chke1t).1

D1spos1t1on 1s

Dase1n's d1scovery of itself as already present to a
ID1SPos1t1on 1s the translat10n of Richardsonz Maoquar1e
and. Rob1nson translate as "state of m1nd". Etymolog1cally
betinden means to oons1der or to tind, and reflex1vely
It oan mean to teel or even to ex1st.
I

. '-..
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partioular situatlon.

basein is never unattached but

always dlscloses itself in an attunement with its ·world.
It is thrown into its environment in the sense that it
always is as that which has been.

•

Nor is it possible to

alter or even improve this "has been,"

o~aracter.

is variously determined and discovers

itsel~

Dasein

already. cast

upon its world.
In der Ge.s timmthei t is t immer schon s timmungsmaessig das Daseln als das Seiende ersohlossen,
dem das Dasein in seinem Sein ueberantwortet
wurde als dem Seln, das es existierend zu sein
hat.
(SZ, p. 134)
I

Heidegger is describing that experience of "just
being there", the b+ute faot of existenoe.

Sartre uses

the word facticity to express a similar idea.

Beflndl1sh-

-keit oould well have been the inspiration for Sartre's
novel

~

Nausee.

That "I am here" is given in the experlence of Dlspositlon but the whenoe and whlther is not

dlsclosed~

It

ls thls factor that prompts the use of the word Thrownness
(Geworfenhei·t ) ~

Thls carries connotatlons of the cast of

the die .· of fate, of belng .thrown on the sea of life, etc.
Wlth such expresslonsHeldegger portrays the
character of Dasein.

~

accompll

Disposition ·is the exlstential source

of Dasein's un-freedom.

It reveals an entity handed over

.- to its fate, thrown onto a situation not of its own ohoosing.
The seoond of Daseln's modes of

17
belng-in-the-world ls Understandlng (Verstehen).
understands lts world.

2

Daseln

Thls understandlng ls, however,

nelther an ldea nor judgement about the world.

•

Rather, it

ls an lmposltlon of meanlngful struotures onto reallty.
Thls ls termed by Heldegger, Projeotlon (Entwurf).

Seelng

lts posslbll1tles Daseln ohooses among them and lmposes on
the existlng world lts partloular way of belng ltself.
Das Verstehen 1st, als Entwerfen, dle Selnsart
des Daselns, ln der es selne Moegllohkelten als
Moegllohkelten 1st. (SZ, p. 145)
Verstehen 1st das exlstenzlale Seln
Selnkoennens des Daseins selbst, so
dieses Sein an ihm selbst das Woran
selbst Seins ersohliesst. (SZ, p.

des elgenen
zwar, dass
des mit lhm
144)

The important word here ls potentiality-for-belng
(Seinskoennen).

To grasp what Heidegger is saying it must

be remembered that the definltion of world is that tota11ty

ot meaningful relationships ,in whloh Daseln finds itself
involved.

The partioular historioal moment in whioh Dasein

finds ltself is not lts oholoe.

It ls determined for Dasein.

Yet in beoomlDg what it oan, Daseln exeroises its freedom
by the oholoes lt makes from these innumerable relationships.
These ohoioes are not the free aots of a faoulty, as in
the olassioal philosophioal def1nition ot the wlll.
rather these oholoes are Dase1n.
a faoulty whioh makes 1t free.

But

Dasein does not possess
Daseln 1s freedom, 1t is its

posslb1litles.
/ 2Rl0hardson preters the translation I

Comprehens1on.

4

18

There is more than just a passing s1milar1ty here
between the He1degger1an use of the word Projection and
the Kant1an doctr1ne of the
~

~

priori.

In Kant the pure

priori 1ntuit1ons of space and t1me can be sa1d to be

projected onto the man1fold of 1ntuition.

Moreover, the

understand1ng th1nks the known object by project1ng onto
1t the categories wh1ch are ultimately t1me-determinat1ons
(Ze1tbest1mmungen).
~

Problem

~

He1degger's study of Kant

(~~

MetaPhYsik) wh1ch appeared shortly after ·

Se1n und Zeit, leaves l1ttle doubt as to the 1nfluence
of Kant on He1degger.
However, 1n sp1te of the remarkable s1m1lar1t1es
between the doctr1nes of Project1on and the Kant1an
prior1, there are notable d1fferences.

~

He1degger 1s not

g1v1ng us an .ep1stemology 1n h1s doctr1ne of Projection.
There 1s no quest10n here of an
real1ty.

~

prior1 1ntu1t1on of

Rather, what Dase1n projeots 1s 1tself, that 1s,

1ts own un1que way of order1ng and comb1n1ng the myr1ad
relat1onsh1ps 1t encounters 1n the world.
The opennes·s to what can become 1s then a d1st1nct1ve
mark of Dase1n.

Th1s 1s why we are able to speak of the

freedom of Dase1n.

Understand1ng accounts for the undeter-

m1ned aspect of Dase1n 1 s ex1stence.
move, always toward the future.
He1degger to speak of the Be1ng

It 1s always on the

Th1s eventually leads
d1s~losed

by the project1ons

19
of Dase1n as Event.)

Be1ng 1s the happen1ng or occurrence

of truth and Dase1n 1s the oooas1on for th1s even't.

Be1ng

~

comes to presence when Dase1n projeots 1tself onto the world.
Th1s 1s no oontrad1ot1on but rather a reo1procal process.
The freedom wh10h Dase1n exero1ses 1n the projeot1on
of 1ts

pos~1b111t1es

and the freedom w1th wh1ch Being be-

oomes present 1s one and the same freedom v1ewed from d1fferent aspeots of the dialeotioal process.
1s one of emphasis.

The difference

As a matter of fact we w111 f1nd that

this placement of emphas1s is the foundation for
sion between an early and a latter Heidegger. 4

any

d1vi-

The earlier

per10d stresses the. freedom of Dasein in the Event of Be1ng;
the latter period oonoerns itself more w1th the orig1n of
th1s Event from beyond Dase1n.
Because , Dase1n 1s a projeoting ent1ty, 1t is ahead
of itself.

It 11ves 1n such a way that it is always more

than 1t aotually 1s.

Its projects keep 1t, 1n a sense, un-

fulf1lled.
Auf dem Grunde des Seinsart, die durch das
Ex1stenzial des Entwurfs konst1tuiert w1rd,
1st das Dase1n staend1g "mehr" als es tatsaech11ch ist, wollte man es und koennte ' man
es als Vorhandenes 1n se1nem Se1nsbestand registr1eren.
(SZ. p. 145)
j Ereign1s oan mean event or ooourrenoe, that whioh comes to
pass. Cf. Vortraege und Aufsaetze, Pful11ngen: Neska,

1954, p. 99.

-

,

4 R1ohardson uses the oonven1ent He1degger I and He1degger II.
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Dasein is doomed to live beyond itselt.
yet aohieved".

It is the "not

This is the stigma of freedom.

Freedom

is at once the glory and ourse of Dasein.
A possible souroe of misunderstanding exists here.
Dasein's freedom to explore the possible and become itself iS1by no means an absolute one.

Understanding is

only one ot the three modes by which Dasein is in its
world.

We have seen that the Thrownness of Dasein has

limited it to a particular environment, place in time,
suoh and such faoticity, eto.

As a result Dasein's pro-

jeotions will be limited by these situations.
words, Dasein enjoys only a finite freedom.
marked oontrast to Sartre's pour
no bounds. 5

!2!

In other
This is in

whose freedom knows

Authentioity tor Dasein involves not only an

exercise of freedom but also an aoceptance of finitude
whioh is most olearly telt in the Resolve tor death.

(cf.

Chapter VI)
Befindlichkeit und Verstehen oharacter1s1eren
als Ex1stenzialien die urspruengliche Erschlossenheit des In-der-Welt-Seins.
1

Der Entwurt des eigensten Seinkoennens 1st
dem Faotum der Geworfenheit in das Da ueberantwortet. (sz, p. 148)
The final existential mode of being-in 1s Discourse
(~).

Riohardson translates this as Logos and de Whaelens

as Discursivite.

Both of these vers10ns have the advantage

SCf. art1ole: Transcendenoe !a ~ Philosophy ~ Haidegger,
Langan, Thomas. The New Soholast101sm, XXXII, 1. '
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that they divoroe in our minds the speoif1oally He1deggerian mean1ng of

~

language and talk.
of these.

from what 1s ord1nar1ly connoted by
D1soourse 1s more gener1c than e1ther

It may express 1tself in language but 1t 1n-

oludes any art1oulation of Dase1n.
ls an eX1stential

And because Disoourse

it 1s the ontolog1cal foundat1on for

all forms of expresslon, inolud1ng language • .
Das existenz1al-ontolog1sohe Fundament der
Spraohe 1st d1e Rede. (SZ, p. 160)
Rede 1st dle Art1kulat1on der Verstaend11chke1t.
Die Hlnausgesprochenhe1t der Rede 1st d1e Spraohe
(SZ, p. 161)

development, language does not seem to play the 1mportant
In the Se1n und Ze1t period of h1s philosophioal

part ln He1degger's th1nking that lt w1ll later.

So much

of the latter He1degger ·deals with language that 1t takes
on an almost exclus1ve occupat10n with 1t.

He1degger's

treatment is not a mere analys1s (as 1s prevalent 1n the
Brit1sh Isles. and Amerlca) but a quasi-poet1cal and at t1mes
mystioal obsession.

One gets the 1mpress1on from some of

the latter titles that He1degger is a poet rather than a
professional philosopher.

At the same period Heidegger

.evinces a keen interest in poets, Rilke and Hoelderin for
instance.

Language is raised to a dignity where it seems

to enjoy a oertain identifioation with Being itself.

"Die

Spraohe ist die Haus des Seins.,,6
In Sein und Zeit however. Heidegger's awareness ot

---7- -

6 Platons Lehre von der wahrheit mit einem brief veber
den Humanismus, Berna Franoke, 1947. p. 53.
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the prerogatives of language ls only beginnlng to take
form.

Discourse ls seen as the artioulatlon of lntelllgl-

blllty.

It ls the world (total intelliglble relatlonships)

ln words.

Dlsoourse can be thought of and dealt with as

merely. present-to-hand as in sclentiflc studies of language
•
•
and ln linguistic analysis. · Philosophloally, however, language is the expression of the dialeotio of freedom and unfreedom.

It is the ory of a being torn between the tenslon

created by its summons to freedom on the one hand, and on
the other, its fall lnto the unfreedom of its everydayness.
Words can come only from the flnitely free.
Dle befindllche Verstaendllchkeit des In-derWelt-seins spricht sich ala der Bede aus.
(SZ, p. 161)
Das Bedeutungsganze der Verstaendllchkelt
kommt zu Wort. (SZ, p. 161)
We have seen the three exlstentials by which Daseln
ls in its world, Disposltlon, Understandlng, and Dlscourse.
These three are authentio ways of being-ln.
corresponds an inauthentic manner.
which Heldegger names are:
Curioal~

To each there

The lnauthentic modes

Amblgulty (Zweldeutlgkelt),

(Neugier), and Idle Talk (Gerede).

Heidegger is

fond of the term Fallennesa (Verfallenhelt) to descrlbe
Dase1n's inauthentic state.
Fallenness, as used in

~ ~~,

with it anT theologioal implioations.

does not carry

Authenticity is not

understood as a state of beatitude from wh10h Dase1n has
been excluded.

On the oontr&r7. Fallenness is as muoh a
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part of Dasein as authentioity.

Dasein fluotuates between

the two and would be meaningless without either.

The ulti-

mate reason for this state of affairs will eventually be
seen to be the temporal oharaoter of Dasein.
The inauthentiolty of Fallenness is best seen in the
rule 'Of the "they".?

Through the surrender of its freedom

Daseln is assiml1ated into the anonymity of the crowd, sharing only the values the orowd diotates.
one; lt ls everyone.

The orowd is no

As fallen into inauthenticity, Dasein

is ln an eminently unfree s ituatl on.

One oan recognize the

oonslderable influence here of Kierkegaard on Beldegger.
Das Wer ist nicht dleser und nicht jener,
nicht man selbst und nioht einlge und nicht
die Summe Aller. Das "Wer" ist das Neutrum.
das Man.
(SZ. p. 126)
Contemporary technology oontributes more surely to
this leveling off of the::, indivldual to the status of the
orowd.

But the suooess of the "they" in maintaining thelr

polnt of vlew is due to the d,i sburdenlng effeot of submission to the "they".

After all, individual respons1b1l1ty

has no plaoe 1n an act that oan be blamed on the group.
Dasein, by losing itself ln this anonymity, ls really
a,ttemptlng to abdicate lts personal responslbi11ty.

It,' 1s

fleelng from 1ts burden of freedom.
Und well das Man mit der Seinsentlastung
dem jewei11gen Daseln staendlg entgegenkommt,
behaelt es und verfest1gt es se1ne hartnaeokige
Herrsohaft. (SZ, p. 128

!"B!! ~a

the orowd, (0';. SZ. p. 126 at seq.)

CHAPTER IV
FINITE FREEDOM AS CARE
Our phenomenologlcal analysls of Daseln has revealed . a flnltely free exlstenoe whloh dlsoloses ltself ' as
oonstltuted by Dlsposltlon, Understandlng, and D1soourse.
Thls ohapter wlll ask whether Daseln can be thought of as
unlfled and lf so,bow so.

In other words, ls there a unlty

to be found ln the manlfestatlon of Daseln as fln1te freedom?

It • • •

wle est exls tenzlal-olltologlsoh dle Ganzhel t des

autgezelgten Strukturganzen zu bestlmmen?1I

(SZ, p. 181)

We are lnqulrlng, tberefore, lnto Daseln as a totallty.
He1degger beglns h1s answer to th1s quest10n by composlng a desor1pt1ve def1nltlon of Daseln, drawn from the
elements we have already seen.
the lmportant existent1als.

In 1t are contalned all

Dase1n 1s ahead of 1tself

(Understandlng), thrown 1n the world (Dlspos1t1on), and
alongslde the be1ngs of the world (D1soourse).1

Can the

meanlng of Dase1n be expressed more suco1notlY?

What ls

the summatlon of the above desor1ptlon?

Heldegger rep11es

that Dase1n 1s care (Sorge) and Care 1s revealed 1n Anxlety
(Angst) •
A phenomenology of anxlety ls necessary, therefore,
lf we are to be able to grasp Daseln as a tota11ty.

iSlob-vorweg-sO.ho~-seln-ln als seln bel.

(SZ, p. 192)
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Anxiety is the ontological equivalent to the emotion of
fear.

In

fearsome.

~ear,

the cause is seen for what 1t 1s, the

In the state of anxiety, however, there 1s an

experience of being threatened but the source of the danger remains ve1led.
~

• freedom.
finite

The origin of anxiety is Dase1n as

My f1nitude is the vague yet powerful

force that · overcomes me with apprehension.
to anxiety Dasein flees.

As

a reaction

The flight is both from itself

and its obligation to freedom, Dasein flees to the "they"
because the crowd takes to itself Dase1n's burden of cho1ce
'and makes Dasein's dec1sions for 1t.

The crowd offers a

measure of spec10us secur1ty w1th wh1ch Dase1n tranqu1l1zes
1tself.
Dei Abkehr des Verfallens gruendet v1elmehr
1n der Angst, die ihrerseits Furcht erst moeglich macht. (8Z, p. 186)
Das Wovor der Angst 1st das In-der-Welt-se1n
als solches. (8Z, P. ta6)
Anx1ety challenges Dasein to 1nqu1re into its world.
It breaks the spell of the "they" and replaces it w1th
authent10 dec1s1on mak1ng.
w1th its poss1b1lities.

Dasein is brought face to face

The freedom involved in being

.. open to poss1bles implies a negation.

For if I can elect

this possible, I am free to negate that one.

The exper1ence

of freedom, inasmuch as it: involves the negat10n of unchosen poss1b1l1ties, is the souroe of Dase1n's exper1ence
of Noth1ngness (Nichts) 1n Anx1ety.
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Die Angst offenbart im Dasein das Sein zum
eigensten Seinkoennen, das heisst das Freisein
fuer die Freiheit des Sich-selbst-waehlens und
-ergreifens. Die Angst bringt das Dasein vor
sein Freisein fuer... Die Eigenlichkeit seines
Seins- als Moeglichkeit, die es immer schon ist.
(SZ, p. 188)

Existential anxiety thrusts Dasein into an immediate
encounter w1th the negation at its heart. In ~ ~
MetaphySik 2 Heidegger again returns to this theme. Nothing
(Nichts) will then be identified with Being.

He1degger re-

calls Hegel's statement:

"Pure· Being and pure Nothing are

thus one and the same. h3

Pure is the decisive word for an

understanding of this difficult statement.
nor Nothing have oontent.

Neither Being

They are the only two perfectly

pure conoep ts • .
With this interpretation of Being, Heldegger sets
himself against the 'olassioal philos'o phical view of Being
as substance.

-

Being (Sein) is not a being (Seiendes)u

Being is not an objeot'in our consciousness, rather it is
the non-substantial source of this consciousness.

And it

1s the revelation of non-be1ng .1n anxiety that is the veil
of Being.

"Das Nichts als das Andere zum Seienden ist der

Schleier des Seins."

(WM, p. 35)

Anxiety, as the existential experience of non-being,
d1scloses a Dasein whose

meani~is

Care.

Care is not

2 ~ ~ Metaphysik, .. 13,~nn: Cohen~ 1930. , Hereafter: WM.

3 ~ Scienoe ~ Logie, Hegel, I, WW. III, p. 74.
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understood 1n the ont10 sense of worry over problems but
as 1nvolvement 1n the world..

As an ent1ty thrown into 1ts

world, but at the same t1me free to comprehend and artioulate 1ts world,
its world.

Dasein reveals 1tself as ooncerned w1th

We are just1f1ed, therefore, 1n speak1ng of the

mean1ng of Dasein as Care.
Th1s def1n1t1on of Dase1n 1s more pr1mal than any
of the def1n1tions 1nsp1red by a present-to-hand analys1s,
e.g. ,man as a rat10nal an1mal.

A def1n1t1on of th1s sort

1s not incorreot, but 1t m1sleads 1n the sense that 1t
poses as exhaust1ve.

On the oontrary, 1t 1s true as far as

1t goes but 1t does not reaoh the depths where Dase1n
dwells.

Fundamentally, Dase1n's mean1ng 1s Care.

It 1s

mean1ngfully absorbed 1n and It1ed to 1ts world.
D1e Sorge le1gt als urspruengl1che Strukturganzheit existenz1al-aprior1sch "vor n jeder,
das he1sst immer schon 1n jeder fakt1schen
"Verhaltung" und "Lage" des Dase1ns. (SZ, p. 193)
The presenoe of an authent10 Care 1ndioates freedom.
The Dase1n that is most free 1s that wh10h 1s fully aware
of 1ts 1nvolvement 1n the world 1nto wh1ch 1t 1s thrown
and wh1ch l1ves 1n an on-go1ng d1alogue w1th the poss1b1l1t1es that l1e before 1t.
add1ot1on to the

worl~

The oppos1te s1tuat1on 1s a mere

which reduoes the value of Care to

a m1lder vers10n of w1sh1ng about what could be and wh1ch
1n rea11ty 1s un-freedom.
Wenn das Dase1n in e1nem Hang gle10hsam
vers1nkt, dann 1st n10ht led1gl1oh nooh e1n
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Hang vorhanden, sondern d1e volle Struktur
der Sorge 1st mod1f1z1ert. B11nd geworden,
maoht es alle Moeg11ohke1ten dam Hang d1enstbar.
(SZ, p. 195)
II'

CHAPTER V
DEATH AS FREELY CHOSEN
Death is a possible.

The fact that we have no evi-

dence of anyone escaping death does not alter its category
as a possible.
is final.

But death is not an ordinary possible.

It

Heidegger defines death as the possibility of

not having any more possibilities e

(SZ, p. 262)

This chap-

ter will ask how Dasein exercises 1ts f'reedom: in face of
the possibility of death.
As

long as Dase1n 1s, the'r e remains something out-

standing, something that remains to be settled.

Without

this settlement, Dase1n is not complete, not achieved.
But death 1s not a mere end for Dasein but a way of' be1ng.
An animal has an end, so does a nebula, but Dase1n l1ves

in such a way that it is always toward 1ts ·end.
being-toward-death.

(~-E!a-~,

It is a

SZ, p. 234)

plicating the unique manner in which death is an end for

He1degger spends several pages of Sein und Zeit ex-

Dasein.

Some of his greatest contribut10ns to phenomeno-

logy are made in the chapter on death.

Dasein does not

come to an end like f'ru1t r1pens or the moon reaches 1ts
complement of' light.
over Dasein.

The end of death constantly hangs

It is an ending being.

Dase1n l1ves with

its end; it ex1sts in an ending manner.

To bring into

relief this most important distinction between the dif'tersnt
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ends, Heidegger prefers to use the word ableben for the
oessation of the

h~an

organism.

The Dasein which thus

lives out its time oan be said to perish; only the Dasein
whioh approaches death authentioally oan be said to die.
Death affords Dasein with the ultimate possibility
for expressing its freedom as an individual.
the most unique thing that I possess.

My death is

No one can share

it and oertainly 1t 1s non-transferable. ' Heidegger makes
the observat1on that death just1f1es h1s earlier identifioat1on of ex1stence and m1neness.

Death br1ngs to the fore

most olearly Dase1n 1 s 1nd1v1dua11ty and freedom because it·
makes Dasein un1que by separat1ng it from the un-freedom

ot the " they" •
Ke1ner kann dem Anderen se1n sterben
abnehmen. (SZ, p. 240)
Am Sterben zeigt sich, dass der Tod

ontolog1sch durch' , Jemein1gke1t und
Existenz konstitulert wird. (SZ, p. 240)

The temptation to abd1cate my freedom and give my
death away is strong.

The orowd will aocept my death.

Indeed the anonymity of the "they. is the only way to
esoape the terror of death.

By putting on the personality

ot the "they" I atta1n 1mmortal1ty.

After all, the crowd

oontinues; only ind1viduals d1e .
Das Man besorgt ••• eine staendige Beruh1gung ,
ueber den Tod. (SZ. p. 253)
Das Man laesst den Mut zur Angst vor dem
Tode n10ht aufkommen. (SZ, p. 254)
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By resisting the temptation to flee its
finds itself. i.e •• aohieves authentioity.

dea~h

Dasein

Prima faoie death

would appear to have no oonneotion with authentioity and
freedom.

If anything strikes us as un-free it is death.

Yet /by aooepting the finitude intrinsio to its death and
denying itself the oomfort of the orowd. Dasein frees itself for its own authentioity.
The power of the "they" in tranquilizing us against
the threat of death takes on its most subtle form in the
public sayings about the certainty of death.
for instanoe. that death is unavoidable.

They say,

Paradoxically.

what gets oovered up in this lip service to death is preoisely its

~ossibility

now*

Dieser wird hinausgeschoben auf· ein "spaeter
einmal" und zwar unter Berufung auf das sogenannte "allgemeine Ermessen". So verdeokt das
Man das Eigentuemliohe der Gewissheit des Todes,
dass er jeden Augenblick moeglich ist. (SZ, p. 258)
The chapter on death provides a more precise delineation of Heidegger' ,s dootrine of Projection.

We will re-

oall that Dasein's understanding of 1ts world was founded
on the projection of possibilities onto that world.

Free-

dom. as implying the negation of un-chosen possib1lit1es.
opened to our purv1ew a nothingness.

(~Niohts).

Now.

as our picture comes more clear,l y .1;lto foous we see the
relationship of death to negation.

Death announces Dasein's

intrinsio temporality and finitude.

The non-be1ng implied

in death permeates the existence of Dasein with negation
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and it is that negation which frees Dasein for its world
of possibles.

Negation is at the heart of every possible

S".i nce each possible is an unactual and, to that extent,
undetermined and free.
Das Sein zum Tode ist Vorlaufen in ein
Seinkoennen des Seienden, dessen Seinsart
das Vorlaufen selbst ist. 1m vorlaufenden
Enthuellen dieses Seinkoennens erschliesst
sich das Dasein ihm selbst hinsichtlich
seiner aeussersten Moeglichkeit. (SZ, p. 262)
The key word in the above text is a new one:
cipation.

Anti-

The actualization of a possible comes about

through Anticipation.

Anticipation is an awaiting by which

Dasein comports itself toward something possible in its
possibility.

tlZu einem Moeglichen in seiner Moeglichkeit

verhaelt sich das Dasein jedoch im Erwarten.tI

(sz,

p. 261)

BY anticipating the possibility of its own death
Dasein accepts this possibility and all of its remifications.

In this act Dasein is freed; freed from the domin-

ance of the "they", freed from its own inauthenticity and
freed from the presence of truth.

The

n~gation

which is

part and parcel of the revelation of death is the source
of that openness which is freedom.

Without the n1chts there

could not be freedom because it would be impossible to say
"no".

And he who is free, can either affirm or deny.

Dasein t S freedom is then a dreadful· ,one •

It is purchased

with the price of finitude.
The influence of Kierkegaard on Heidegger is"of

33
course, quite strong here, as is the influence of Heidegger
on Bartre.

The doctrine of a freedom achieved through a tho-

roughgoing antioipatory aooeptance of death can be interpreted
either optimistically or pessimistically.

Kierkegaard took a

religious view of the matter and proclaimed it a sickness not
unto death.

Bartre's view was more morbid, in that. it found

in this situation. something intrinsioally apsurd.

It is a

moot question whether or not Bartre's interpretation of Heidegger was correct.

~ ~ ~

does seem to lend itself to

a reading such as Sartre gave it.

On the other hand Heidegger

has oonsistently disassociated himself from the pessimistio
school of existentialism as he has from the existentialist
movement.

He has named himself a philosopher of being and

denied any place for moralizing in his

philosoph~.

However this question may be deoided, one must admit
that the early Heidegger could easily have been interpreted
as providing a souroe for a philosophy of absurdity.
this is the .r eading that influenced Bartre.

And

But as Heidegger

\

himself evolved in his thinking, he beoame more hopeful.
Man's freedom becomes more than a curse. it is also a source
of his hope for meaningfulness. 1
lIn a book of poems written in 1947, Aus der Erfahrung des
Denkens, Heidegger desoribes us as being in a period or-iaiting between the old gods, whioh have left us, and the Advent
of Being, the apparent new birth.
Wir kommen fuer die Goetter zu spaet und zu frueh das
Beyn. Dessen anfangenes Gedioht ist der Mensoh. (ED,p.7)
Wir sollen niohts tun sondern warten. (G. p. 37)
We oan appreciate the:i.promise in this if we remember that
to wait is'clearly to have begun the aotualization of the
object ot our wait. (BZ, p. 2q2)

Antlolpatlon, as the full acoeptanoe of death,
wlth a shatterlng force on Dasein's oomplacenoy.

~cts

Dasein

is tempted to be satisfied with whatever existence it has
aohieved but the antiolpation of death, by showlng Daseln
lts f1nal poss1bllity is not-Daseln, destroys lts sense of
achlevement and drives lt to newer posslbllltles.

Heidegger

quotes Nietszohe to the effeot that Dase1n ls saved from
"becomlng too old for lts victor1es."

(SZ, p. 264)

It is only through Antlc1pation that Daseln comes into
possession of the totallty of lts own belng, not that Daseln
oeases to be ahead-of-ltself but rather that it grasps the
.
.
imp11cations of its full belng.
Das Vorlaufen ersohliesst der Existenz als aeusserste Moegllohkelt die Selbstaufgabe und zerbrlcht so jede Versteifung auf die . je erreiohte
Existenz. Das Dasein behuetet sloh. vorlaufend.
davor, hlnter slah selbst und · das verstandene
Seinkoennen zurueckzufallen e • • • (SZ, p. 264)

I>

CHAPTER VI
COMMITMENT TO FREEDOM
Th1s chapter w1ll deal w1_th He1degger's doc1tr1ne of
Comm1tment or Resolve (Entschlossenheit).

Resolve will be

seen as Dasein's laying claim to its freedom through an aoceptance of its finitude.

The phenomenology of Resolve will

reveal conscience as a witness to Dasein's potentiality for
being free.
Dasein is summoned to authenticity by a witness.

The

witness offers testimony to Dasein's potentiality-for-beinga-whole.

The witness is conscience.

At the outset of -his

phenomenology of conscience Heidegger disavows any of the
usual theological connotations.

Conscience, both in Latin
and German, is etymologically "that which is knownll • 1 But
a more profound investigation into this pehnomenon will reveal it as a call.

The call is always one of gu1lt, and the

accused is Dasein.
D1e eindringlichere Analyse des Gewissens
enthuellt es als Ruf. Der Gewissensruf hat den
Charakter des Ansrufs des Daseins auf se1n e1genstes Selbstse1nkoennen und das in der Weise des
Aufrufs zum e1gensten Sohuldigsein. (SZ, p. 209)
The call is addressed to the self.
over the "they-self" as insign1f1cant.
be heeded by the self.

It therefore passes
The call can only

The crowd does not have a conscience

1 .The German is ~ Gew1ssen.

\
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but only a .vague urge to lnhlblt freedom by reduolng everythlng to the same level.

In answerlng the oall Daseln

frees lts oWn self (elgen) and thereby aohleves authentl01 ty (Elgentllohkel t) •.

The oall ls silent.
about anythlng.

It gives no data or informatlon

In a sense it oommunloates nothlng.

The

only awareness it delivers over ls the awareness of nothlngness.

It ls preoisely the negatlon ln Dasein that ls the

oall;

the negatlon of its Thrownness, ot lts Fallenness.

Dasein is guilty of being nothing.
.-..,.

And lts gullt ls In-

ourred not by way of a fall from a state of virtue but
rather by the very faot of its existenoe, Dasein ls gUilt.
Gle10hwohl liegt 1n der Idee von "sohuld1g" der
Charakter des Nloht. • • • d1e formal ex1stenz1ale Idee des "schuldig" bestimmen w1r daher
also: Grundsein fuer ein durch ein N1cht best1mmtes Se1n- das helsst Grundseln einer Nloht1g- '
kel t. (SZ, p .. 283)
Not only ls Daseln the addressee of the oall of consolenoe, it is also the oaller.

Consolence ls the summons

of Dasein from itself to be itself. 1.e. to be all its freedom wlll allow.

The response to the oall of oonscienoe is

given by Dasein in its Resolve to be ltself through acceptanoe of lts nothlngness.

Let us investlgate more preoisely

the nothlngness oontalned ln eaoh of Dasein's exlstentlals.
As thrown, Daseln ls wlthout a basls (Grund).
Daseln finds ltself already delivered over to a world not
of lts ohoutfl.l1g.

Moreover, Daseln oan never

be

sald

~o
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have a sufficient reason 2 for its existence, since, as a
free being, it is independent of any fundament in the metaphysioal sense.

Its only fundamentum ls nothlngness.

Es 1st hie existent vor selnem Grunde, sondern
je nur aus ihm und als dleser. Grundsein besagt
demnach des eigensten Seins vom Grund auf nle
maechtlg seln. Dieses Nicht gehoert zum exlstenzialen Sinn der Geworfenhelt. (SZ, p. 284)
As projeoting Dasein can only grasp one of the possl-

'bilities lying before it at any one instance and must thereby negate all others.

This is basic tQ all freedom.

The

choice of one possibility invariably involves the negation
of others.
Dle Freihelt aber 1st nur in der Wahl der
elnen, das heisst in Tragen des Nichtgewaehlthabens und Nichtauchwaehlenkoennens der
anderen.
(3Z, p. 285)
The question of nothingness will be returned to in
the essay on Metaphysics.

(of. H!!

~

Metaphysik, 1930)

There, after Heidegger has had-the time to meditate the
significance of the "not", it will appear as indispensable
for the revelation of Being but at the same time as the
oause of the hiddenness of Being in metaphysics.

Being

and non-Being are reciprooal parts of the same process,
the coming to presenoe of truth.

The cardinal error of

metaphysios has been to identify Being with one or more of
its aspects.

Being is beyond the categories or the sum of

2 In classical metaphysics the Principle of Sufficient

Reason (Nihil sine Fundamento) sought a substantive origin
for every existing thing. Dasein is conceived by Heidegger
as unsubstantial and therefore without suffioient reason.

)8

,.
all of them.

Heidegger olaims that Parmenides saw this

and Plato glimpsed 1t, but with Aristotle a demean1ng of
Being began.
error.

Yet metaphysics is more than an ' ontolog10al

It is a neoessar7 part of the histor7 of ph110sophy.

The revelations of Being 1n history are always followed by
a per10d of untruth and error.
Noth1ng 1s that wh10h makes the revelat10n of
what-is as such possible for our human ex1stenoe.
Nothing not merely provides the oonoeptual oppos1te
for what-is but it 1s also an original part of its
essence. (WM, p. )40)
Only beoause Nothing is revealed 1n the very bas1s
of our Dasein is it possible for the utter strangeness of what-is to dawn on us.
(WM, p. 347)
Heidegger has been the cause of much consternat10n 1n
the philosophioal world with his almost obsessive preoocupat10n with nothingness.
noth1ng in~o something.)

He has been aocused of making

Nevertheless ' Heidegger has made

a good oase for h1s ins1stenoe on the importance of the
Nichts.

It is only through an aooeptanoe of the nothingness

revealed in the oall of oonsoienoe that Dasein attains its
freedom and authent10ity.
This aooeptanoe by Dasein of 1tself in all the 1mp11oat10ns of 1ts non-being 1s named Resolution (Entsohlossen~)8

The hearing (hoeren) of the call of guilt brings

Dasein to realize its loss in'""'the "they" and makes Dase1n
JHeidegger's 1nquiry into the ontological essence of
nothing ( ••• ontolog1schen Wesen des Nioht ueberhaupt •••
SZ, p. 285) was the oooasion for numerous philosophioal
jests.
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subm1ss1ve (hoer1g) to 1ts full potent1a11ty-for-be1ng.
See1ng 1ts f1n1tude and the negat10n at 1ts essenoe, Dase1n
projeots upon this negat10n through a oomm1tment to be 1tself.

!~

Dase1n thus frees 1tself to beoome what 1t oan.
D1e Gew1sshe1t des Entschlusses bedeutet:
S1chfreihalten fuer seine moegliche und je ·
factisch notwendige Zurueoknahme. Im. Gegenteil: dieses Fuer-wahr-halten als entschlossenes S1oh-frei-halten fuer die Zuruecknahme
1st d1e elgentllohe Entsohlossenhelt zur W1ederholung 1hrer selbst. (SZ, p. 308)

'.

'- '

•

CHAPTER VII

TEMPORALITY AS FINITE FREEDOM
Dasein has revealed itself as .a thrown, projecting,
fallen being-in-the-world.

This finitely free existence

has been summarily expressed as Care.

Our next task w1ll

be to inqu1re into the meaning of Care.
fication for our use of such a term?

Wha~

is the justi-

Is there a more pro-

found 1ns1ght still to be had, which will shed fuller
light on Dasein as Care?
and responds that
of Care.

Heidegger answers affirmatively,

~emporality

(Zeitlichkeit) 1s the mean1ng

This ohapter w1ll seek an understand1ng of Tem-

porality, and an explanation of its relat10nship to freedom.
' Tempora11ty 1s not time.

W1th the word "time ll we

invar1ably associate ' images of oalendars and olocks, time
loans, time capsules, and so forth.

These indicate the

durational and successional aspects of t1me.

Heidegger,

however, sees the above concept10ns of time as inadequate.
Indeed, he ins1sts that the phenomenon of t1me has never
been correctly understood in the h1stQry Qf western ph1losophy.
For He1degger, Temporality is the foundat1on for all
other 1mages of time.

Anyth1ng that has or can be said about

t1me from the venerable def1n1t10n of Ar1stotle to the

r•
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~t bestimm~en

of

~ant,

of Daseln t s , temporality.

derlves from the prlmal faot
Let us recall each of Daseln's

exlstentlals and explore thelr temporal content.

•

As free, Daseln is oonstantly comlng toward ltself
and its posslbillties; lt ls a not-yet-achleved entlty, always projeotlng ltself.
speak of a future.

It ls for thls reason

tha~

we can

Daseln does not plan ahead beoause there '

ls a future, there ls a future because Daseln ls a free,
projectlng belng-ln-the-world.

•

Das dle ausgezelchnete Moegllohkelt aushaltende,
ln lhr slch auf slch Zukommen-lassen 1st das urspruengllohe Phaenomen 'der Zukunft. (SZ, p. 325)
••• das Vorlaufen selbst nur moeglloh 1st, sofern
das Daseln als selendes ueberhaupt schon lmmer auf
slch zukommt, das helsst ln selnem Seln ueberhaupt z~enftig 1st. (SZ, p. 325)

•
As

thnown, Daseln 15 determlned.

Only from the basls

of the un-freedom of Thrownness ls lt posslble for Daseln
to resolve.

It ls due to the determlnant of Daseln t s

Thrownness that we oan speak of a

past~

AJ3 thrown, Daseln

ls that entlty whlch has a past, and it is preoisely the
limlt-situatlon lmposed by the past that inhibits Dasein's
freedom.
Dle Uebernahme der Geworfenheit ist aber nur so
moeglich, dass das zukuenftige Dasein sein elgenstes "wie es je shon war". das heisst sein IfGwesen"
seln kann. (SZ, p. 326)
The entire prooess by which Dasein embraces the

•

nullity of its Thrownness and frees itself from the ttthey"
in the projeotion of authentio possibilities produoes what
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we oall the "present".
temporal.

Daseln ls, therefore, baslcally

And tlme, as Heldegger understands lt, dlsoloses

itself as the ultimate meaning of Daseln.

From this it

follows that the Platonl0 attempt to see beyond the world
of the temporal to a non-temporal origin is futlle.

In

thls Heldegger shows himself to be profoundly Kantian.
Time is Dasein's horizon, 1.e. there is for Dasein no
vision of anything beyond the temporal.

It is for this

reason that Heidegger will be able to say that the question
of Being whiph initially motivated his philosophical quest
is ultimately a question about the mystery of time. 1 w~
are now ln a positlon to understand what Heldegger intended
when he entitled Part One of

~ ~ ~l

"The Interpre-

tation of Dasein as Temporality and the Demonstratlon of
Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of
Being. ,,2
The temporal horlzon is the oondltion for the possibility of such an entity as Dasein.

Heldegger refers to

Dasein as an eostatio belng, literally, it is outside of
itself.

(Greek:

~

stasein)

T~e

transoendental Dasein '

lCf. Q!! Gegenwart ~ Philosophle, Rombach, H., Chapter
". XI I Zei t und Sein
2Transoendental in Heldegger's sense (as in Kant's) means
~ priorl and universal.
The Heidegger of ~ ~ ~
denies the transcendent, i.e, that there is anything in
our -experience beyond time's horizon,
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has orossed over the l1m1tat1ons of 1ts Thrownness to the
I

freedom of 1ts poss1b1l1t1es.

•

As such, Dase1n 1s 1n ecstasy.

D1e ekstat1sche E1nhe1t der Ze1t11chke1t, das
he1sst d1e E1nhe1t des "ausser-s1ch" 1n den
Entrueckungen von Zukunft, Gewesenhe1t, und
Gegenwart. 1st d1e Bed1ngung der Moeg11chke1t
dafuer, dass e1n Se1endes se1n kann, das als
se1n ' ttDa n exist1ert. (SZ, pO
. 350)

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
My

---

study of Se1n und Zeit leads me to conclude that

there is no essential difference in He1degger l s understanding ot treedom and temporality.

A complete understanding

of freedom in He1degger inoludes not only the capao1ty for
the projection of possibilities but also the determinant
of Thrownness.

Un-freedom is, therefore, part of the

essenoe of freedom just as un-truth or error is of the
essenoe of truth.

,( Cf. WW, Chapter VI)

Dase1n is what it oan become.
in terms of its possibilities.

That is, it 1s defined

As an entity ahead of it-

self, 1t d1reots 1ts development by projecting the innumerable alternatives open to it.

But the negation whioh lies

in every affirmat10n ot Dasein1s possib1lit1es (the affirmation of one poss1ble oloses off other ohoices) introduoes
a limit to freedom.
fallen.

As negating, Dase1n is thrown and

Freiedom for He1degger .1s, then, essentially f1ni te.
\

To aot freely means to aot in a l1m1t-s1tuat1on.

No free-

dom 1s without its un-freedom.
Our thes1s is that freedom so understood is 1dentical
with temporality.

The two are complimentary aspeots of the

same prooess; they are different articulations of the same
phenomenon.

Sein und Zeit is olear that the reason· we oan
--
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speak of a future, the very reason for the ex1stence of
calendar and clock t1me 1s Dase1n 1 s freedom to projeot 1ts
posslbllitles.

The future ls Daseln as posslbll1ty.

Thls ls, however, not the total phenomenon.
every projectlon lnvolves a llmitat1on.

For

The llmlt 1s the

past lnto whlch Daseln is thrown; that whlch oannot be
ohosen.

Thls statl0, determinant aspect of Daseln 1 s exlst-

enoe ls essentlally lnvolved ln every thrust toward the
future.

Man llves suspended, as lt were, between the t wo ,

and thls ls the meaning of temporality.

Tlme is the name

we give the experience ot existing at the ohiasma between
what oan beoome and what oannot.

PART TWO

GELASSENHEIT

CHAPTER I
RELEASED FOR FREEDOM
........

Gelassenhe1t represents the mature Heidegger
1n the
,
treatment of the problem of freedom. 1 The d1alogue ,form
is used.

The latter writings of Heidegger show a prefer-

ence for less formal and more l1terary forms of expression
for phllos9phlcal ideas.

Thus the. treatises and d1sserta-

tions of the early years are dlscarded for the essays,
dlalogues, and even poems of the latter period.
~

Gelassen-

ls set on a country walk wlth a teaoher, scholar

solentlst as part1c1pants.

~

Thls chapter w1ll deal wlth

Gelassenhe1t's oontrlbutlons to the freedom-questlon.
The d1alogue beg1ns wlth the observatlon that for
Kant thlnklng was spontaneity and therefore a type of
wlll1ng.

Heldegger, who plays the role 1n the dialogue

of the teacher, paradox1callY ,asserts that lf we 4re to
disoover the nature of th1s wllling we must look away from
it; that ls, we must f1rst grasp what un-w1lling ls.
Heldegger ls attempting to dlsabuse us of the tradltlonal
.14ea of freedom (the ac t of the faculty of the will) ln
preparatlon for hls understand1ng of freedom.
lAlthough the pub11catlon date of Gelassenhelt 1s 1959,
Heidegger tells us in a footnote that the dialogue was
wrltten down ln 1944-45 from a oonversation held at that
tlme.

-

,
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Thls un-wllllng ls a preparatory step for Releasement. 2
Sle wollen eln Nlcht-Wollen 1m Slnne der
Absage an das Wollen, damlt wir uns durch
dleses hlndurch auf das gesuchte Wesen des
Denkens, das nicht eln Wollen ist, einlasaen
koennen oder una wenlgstens hlerzu bereltmachen.
(G, p. 33)
The termlnus

~

guo of thls Releasement ls willing in the

tradltlonal sense of the operatlon of a faculty.
terminus

~

The

guem ls the essence of willlng whioh Heldegger

ls seeklng and attempting to name.

The entlre prooess ls

begun by an ao t of renuncla tl on- (Absage).
It ls noteworthy that Heidegger evlnoes some amb1gu1ty 1n deal1ng w1th the relat1onsh1p between Releasement and the renouncement of w1ll1ng.

At f1rst he tells us

that the former 1s produced by the latter.

Then, as 1f 1n

an attempt for prec1s1on, he states that un-w1ll1ng only
prepares us ror Releasement.

Thls 1ndec1s1on takes on

1mportance when lt ls remembered that 1n the early Heidegger
the emphasls 1n the revelation of Belng ls no 19nger g1ven
to Dase1n but to Be1ng 1tself.

Daseln s1mply prepares

1tself for Be1ng.
That Releasement is effeoted from beyond the nature

2The word Gelassenheit deserves some attention.

The root
lassen means to let appear, to look, to leave alone, to
allow. Gelassenheit means ord1nar1ly patience, selfpossession, even resignation. The context seems to ind1cate that Heidegger intends the word in some sense of
udetaohing oneself and handing oneself over for somethlng".
I have ohosen "Releasement" as a translatlon.
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of man is explicitly stated by the scientist:
Gelassenheit wird also anderswoher bewirkt."

"Die
(G, p. ,)4)

We are not ourselves responsible for the awakening of this
release.

On the' other hand, however, it is no effete
-

passivity in the sense of letting things happen.

The Re-

leasement of whioh Heidegger speaks is beyond our oonoepts
of aotivity and .p aSsivity.

(of. G. p. 36)

To summarize what we have seen thus far one can speak
of two Releasements.
traditional sense of

First, Dasein frees itself from the
~illing

(much in the same way that

Dasein freed itself from the "they" in

~ ~ ~)

and holds itself in preparation for a second Releasement
whioh is effeoted from beyond Dasein.
Several highly poetio sentenoes are inserted in the
dialogue to the effect that the conversation succeeds because of a oalm which arrives with the approach of evening.
-.........

There is also a referenoe to a mysterious guiding hand which
is given credit for direoting the dialogue.
Immer geloester vertraue ich dem unsoheinbaren
Geleit, das uns in diesem Gespraech an die Hand,
oder richtiger gesagt, beim Wort nimwt. (G, p. 34)
Many interpretBtions of the symbolism of the approaching
night and gUiding-' ,hand could be offered but since I hesitate to indulge in the conjeotural, let me be content with
taking note of the profoundly poetioal turn of the latter
Heldegger.
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In his efforts to explore the freedom of Releasement Heidegger ·makes one of his rare acknowledgements of
indebtedness to Meister Eckhart.

Although this 13th century

founder of German mysticism was still in the metaphysical
tradition because of his attempts to think Releasement in
terms of the will, nevertheless he did at least glimpse the
problem and ·from him much is to be learned.
blem is

n~t

a

Still, the pro-

theologioal one, as Heidegger sees it. We

must avoid all thoughts of Releasement as a disoipline of
self in favor of . the divine will.
Our task is to think the mystery of freedom which we
have called Releasement.

Suooess is impossible if we expeot

that thought must be representational. The nature of freedom
whioh we are pursuing and trying to name does not admit of
oonceptualization.

~

image we might attempt will only

serve to oloud the issue.

The scientist and scholar find

this profoundly disturbing.
solution is to wait.

(G. Q2) ":

The teaoher suggests the only

"Wir sollen nichts tun sondern warten."

It should be remembered that waiting played an

important part in the freedom-doctrine of

~ ~ ~.

Waiting was a integral part of Projeotion by which Dasein
opened itself to the horizon of possibilities and held
itself in preparation for

thel~aotualization.

(SZ. p. 262)

It will be recalled that horizon played an 1mportant
part 1n the early Be1degger.

By way of a v1sual analogy,

the f1eld of vision would be to the peroe1ved objeot as the
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horizon would be to the known object.

What is central is

the insight that the horizon is not another objeot of experience, rather it is that which permits the objeots to
be enoountered. 3

Now, in Gelassenheit. we find the doo-

trine of horizon expanded and g1ven a new name, the Region
(Gegnet).4
The f1rst oharaoteristic of the Reg10n 1s 1ts openness.
Wir sagen, dass w1r in den Horizont hineinsehen.
Der Gesiohtskreis 1st also ein Offenes, welche
Offenheit ihm nioht dadurch zukommt, dass w1r
h1ne1nsehen. (g, p. 39)
The Reg10n 1s open · because it does not oonstrain the objects of exper1ence but allows them to be what they are.
He1degger expresses this 1n terms of letting things rest,
shelter1ng them, proteot1ng them in the1r manifestat1on.
The th1ngs of exper1enoe are g1ven the freedom to be themselves.
FABER wo ruhen die Dinge, und worin besteht
das Ruhen?
L S1e ruhen in der Rueckkehr zur Weile der
Weite ihres Sichgehoerens.

J

By way of tangential comment, one is reminded at this
point that Heidegger develops a criticism of traditional
metaphysical god-theories from his doctrine of horizon.
God, aooording to Heidegger, could -never be another Bains
among beings, albeit a super-being. (The Ontho~theo
logical Nature of Metaphysics, in Identitaet und D1fferenz,
Phhll1ngen: Neska, 1957)
-

4 Gegnet is South German dialeot for Gegend.
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G Kann denn in der Rueokkehr, die dooh
Bewegung ist, eine Ruhe sein?
L Gar wohl, falls die Ruhe der Herd und
das Walten aller Bewegung ist. CG, p. 4)
Heidegger makes no effort to minimize the paradoxes
involved in some of his statements.

The return, for in-

stanoe, of the objeot would seem to suggest a motlon.

Yet,

the objeot is sald to be at rest and to abide in the free
area whioh is the Expanse of Openness.
The free Region oan not be thought conceptually, that
would reify it and thereby destroy its freedom.

The Region

is free precisely because it does not have the determination
of a thing in experience.

Man can, however, dispose hlm-

self for the appearance of the Region by renouncing all representational endeavors.

Heidegger calls for a type of

self-discipline by whioh we put behind us all attempts to
oonceptualize the Region and wait attentively for what must
qom~

ultimately from beyond us.

latter Baidegger.

This is typical of the

Ossein is no longer the source of the

Openness but rather the freedom of the open Region is bestowed from a source whioh is veiled and beyond the power
of Dasein to control.
The free Region ocours; it is a process.

Besides the

noun Gegnet He1degger also uses gegnen,5 to oppose or to
region.

The Region is not static but in aot.

Indeed, it

SAgain. this verb is found only in South. German dialeo:ts,
the araa of Heidegger's birth.
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enjoys greae autonomy.

It is said to present itself subtly

to the d1alQgue w1thout the knowledge of the partic1pants.
Moreover. it is answerable only to itself.

Man's task is

to bow to the autonomy of the Reg10n by remov1ng the obstruct10ns which an objectifying thinking plaoes in the way
of the freedom of the Region.
So powerful is the domain of the Reg10n that it lays
olaim to man.

It assimilates him as if he were property.

Heidegger uses the word "appropr1ates" (geeignet) to descr1be the possession of Dasein . by the Region.

The Region

takes Dase1n tor its own and thereby makes it authentic
(eigenlich).

One is naturally
reminded here of Hegel's
.

theory of freedom, in whioh man is truly free only when
.

.

submitting to the Absolute.

(of. He 1degger , Riohardson,

331 et seq.)
The appropriation of Dasein by the Reg10n is not
permanent.

As soon as man is claimed by the Region, he is

already being lost to it.

This restless back and forth

between the freedom of a Releasement to the Reg10n and the
forgetfulness of freedom 1n inauthenticity is the fate
of Dasein.

Heidegger speaks of a suspension between the

yes and no, between Being and non-Being.

(G, p. 53)

This

clearly indicates, although in a more poetio manner than
the early works, the finitude of man's releasement.

How-

ever, Gelassenheit does give evidenoe of an attempt by
Heidegger to transcend the dialectio of treedom and un-freedom

1n wh1ch man 1s 1mpr1soned and seek a source outside of the
d1aleot1cal prooess.

Th1s source would be the or1gin of

our exper1ence of freedom.

Heidegger suggests the name:

Region1ng.
G ••• 1st 'd1e Bez1ehung der Gegnet zur Gelassenhait wader ain kausaler W1rkungszusammenhang.
noch das hor1zontal-transzendentale Verhaeltn1s •
••• due Bez1ehung ••• kann weder als ontische noch
als 1 ontologisohe gedaoht werden •••
L sondern nur als Vergegnis.

(0, p.

55)

It is not easy to exaggerate the importance of this ·
step 1n He1degger's think1ng.

In the early He1degger

Dase1n was the source of the freedom whioh made man authent1c; 1n the latter He1degger th1s freedom oomes from outs1de Dase1n.

-

The paradox1cal result 1s that we must seek

the nature of man outs1de of man, 1.e., from the Reg10n of
Openness.
L Nur 1nsofern das Wesen des Menschen nicht aus
dem Menschen sein Gepraege erfaehrt, sondern
aus dem. was wir d1e G~gnet und ihre Vergegnis
nennen, ereignet sioh die von Ihnen geahnte
Geschichte als die Gesoh1ohte der Gegnet.
(G. p. 58)
The Region 1s responsible for man's history.

H1story

is not so muoh oreated by man as it is directed from the
Reg1on.

Directed but not diotated.

The Region does not

foroe itself upon man in the sense that man loses his freedom.

But not that freedGm is oonoeived as originating

primarily 'with the Region, mants part becomes increasingly
passive.

He is to prepare himself by a recept1ve waiting

for the d1reot1ons of the Region.
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'Das Ges1ch1cht11che beruht 1n der Gegnet 'und
1n dem, was s1ch als d1e Gegnet ere1gnet, d1e,
dem Menschen s1ch zuschickend, ihn 1n sein
Wesen vergegnet. (G, p. 59)
Die also verhalten ausdauernde Gelassenheit
waere die Empfaengnis der Vergegnis der Gegnet.
(G, p. 61)
He1degger exp11c1tly states the continuity of this thought
with the dootrine of Resolve 1n Sein

~~.

Thus the

freedom whereby man oommits himself to his finitude 1s an
aspeot of the freedom of the Region.
Man muesste dann z.B. das wort "Entsohlossenhe1t"
so denken, wie es in "Sein und Zeit" gedacht 1st:
als das eigens uebernommen'e S1choeffnen des
Dase1ns fuer das Offene ••• (G, p. 61)

CHAPTER II
CONCLUSION
A reading of Heidegger will disolose an evolution in
his thought.

The first thing that strikes the reader is that

the early works tend to be lengthy and teohnioal, while the
latter are shorter and poetioal.

But behind this stylistio

differenoe there lies a more profound and momentous ohange.
S9me of Heidegger's oommentators have referred to this as
a reversal.

Some (e.g. Riohardson) would seem to suggest

that there are really two He1deggers .. , as if one were dealing with not one but two suooessive philosophers.

There

is perhaps a danger of exaggerating the differenoe between
the early and latter Heideggers.

Nothing 1n the latter

Heidegger refutes the early Heidegger.

Aotually, the more

one reads the entire oorpus, the more one beoomes oonvinoed
of a remarkable oontinuity.
Nevertheless, there is solid ground for making a distinotion between the Heidegger of Se1n und Zeit and the
.......

---

Heidegger of those writings published after 1930.

The dif-

ferenoe is not so muoh one of dootrine but one of emphas1s.
, "Heidegger begins with the being-question as his problematio.
The monument of

~ ~ ~

approaohes this problem from

the point of v1ew of a phenomenologioal analysis of Dasein.
The analysis is largely suooessful; so suooessful, in faot,
that one gets ,the impression that the being-question begins
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and ends with Dasein.

As the oreator of freedom, Dasein is

the oynosure of attention.

Yet, 1n the m1dst of this pre-

oooupation with the _prerogatives of Dase1n, there is still
the unanswered question as to the source of time and freedom.
~ ~ ~

oloses with this quest10n st11l unanswered.

(SZ. p. 437)
With the development of his thought in Gelassenheit
Heidegger 1ncreas1ngly sh1fts emphas1s from the prerogatives
of Dasein to a source of rreedom beyond man.

Heidegger

th1nks less about the part of Dase1n in projecting a free
world, and more about freedom and un-freedom as a d1alect1c
•

1

from wh10h the freedom of Dasein or1ginates.

The s1tuat1on

1s analogous to that of the evolut10n from the theology of
the M1ddle Ages to the anthropology of the Renaissanoe.
In He1degger (although I do not w1sh to suggest the oonstruotion or a theology, str10tly speaking, by Heidegger)
there 1s an evolut1on from the anthropolog1cally or1ented
days of Se1n und Ze1t to the transcendent or1entatiQn of

---

the latter ..-per1od.

CRITIQUE
I offer now. by way of or1t1oal appraisal. some re' marks on the s1gn1fioance of He1degger 1 s dootr1ne of freedom.

F1rst. I hope to prov1de a deeper 1ns1ght into the

revolut10nary aspeot of
freedom.

~ ~

Ze1t·s understand1ng of

Seoondly, I w1ll demonstrate the 1mportance of

I

•

Gelassenhe1t to be based on 1ts overoom1ng of the Kant1an
temporal hor1zon.
(1) Trad1t10nally, ph1losophy has tended to look
upon freedom as the act of a faculty.

An analogy was oon-

struoted between the 1ntellect and the w1ll.

Just as the

soul was thought to possess a faoulty. the intelleot, which
produoed aots of understand1ng and had for 1ts object 1deas,
so too the w1ll was conce1ved as a faoulty whioh produoed
aots of freedom.

The true was the objeot of the 1ntellect

and the good the objeot of the w1ll.
Heidegger's understanding of freedom stands in marked
contrast to th1s faoultat1ve theory.

Freedom 1s not an aot

of Dasein- the aot of freedom 1s Dase1n.
here that is revolut10nary.

There 1s much

He1degger 1s rejecting all

ph1losoph1es which see Dase1n as a substance to wh1ch certain powers (rationa11ty, vo11t10n) have been added,

For

He1degger, Dase1n 1s poss1bi11ty, development. process.
1s what it can become.

It

Freedom 1s the fundamental datum

wh10h a phenomenology of Dase1n produoes, and whatever else
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can be said of Dasein oan only be said beoause of 1ts
freedom.

Even Dasein's understanding of its world is pre-

dicated upon its freedom.
With this doctrine Heidegger ciroumvents two of the
most treacherous problems the history of philosophy has
encountered in dea11ng with freedom.

First . the faculta-

tive theory of freedom had to explain the contradiotion
between the necessity of a free' act ' being uncaused and the
problem of conceiving a faoulty. albiet the will, which
oould produce .aots which were unoaused.

The by-passing

of the entire question of a faoultative freedom has spared
Heidegger the agony of oonstruoting a faoulty whioh aoted
without effeots.
Seoondly.muoh energy 1n the history of philosophy
has been expended 1n the attempt to reoonoile the freedom
of God with the freedom of man.
over predestination w1tness this.

The medieval controvers1es
Moreover. this problem

reours in the philosophy of Hegal, who finally oonoludes
that man must submit to the freedom of the Absolute to find
his own freedom.
necessary.

With

Heid~gger

this submission 1s un-

Sinoe there is no distinotion between Sein

. and Dase1n. there oan never be a confliot between them .
If freedom ' s or1gin is beyond man. as I have tried to demonstrate is the oase in the early Heidegger v this does not
allow one to oonalude that Dasein is subordinated to the '
souroe ' of freedom.

The freedom of Being is one and the
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same w1th the freedom of Dase1n.
It must never be forgotten that the freedom of
Dase1n 1s a 11m1ted one.

Dase1n 1s an on-go1ng ent1ty, but

th1s does nat m1t1gate 1ts rad1cal 1mmers1on in the world
of everyday ,p etty conoerns and 1nauthentic distractions.
Dase1n 1s fin1te freedom.

To be free means to be a part ·

of the temporal process and th1s 1n turn means to experienoe
the tens10n of one's l1m1tat1ons 1n the cont1nuing search
for real1zat1on.
(2) Although Heidegger's theory of freedom avoids the
problems of a faoultative theory and those of a ph1losophy
which would see a oonfl1ot between

~

and Dasein, it must

be adm1tted that the .freedom-dootrine of Heiqegger creates

a ser10us d1ff1culty.

There 1s· a

~emptat1on

to conclude

from the read1ng of the early He1degger that manls ex1stence
1s an absurd one.

The faot that man 1s defined as the pro-

cess of freedom, leaves man w1thout a plaoe of rest.

All

1s development and movement, seemingly w1thout any f1nal
ach1evement.

For a final1ty 1n the process of freedom

would destroy Dasein and replaoe it w1th the statio existenoe of a present-to-hand
The result of

ent~ty .

Heidegger~s

world without absolutes.

doctrine of freedom 1s a

For, .by definition , an absolute

1s released from determ1nat1on.

It is absolved .

In the

early He1degger, however. t1me was the hor1zon or all exper1enoe and noth1ng oould be oonce1ved that did not l1e

\
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under its pall.

Man was, in the philosophy of the early

Heidegger, a voyager who never saw port and whose only
consolation was the satisfaction that might be gained by
solving the problems of his journey as they arose.
could never be
to reach.

There

respite to look forward to, no harbor

any

Man's fate was that of Sisyphus.

It 1s 1n the light of th1s perplex1ty that we must
seek the importance of

Gelas~ef).hei t.

I propose that- the

significance of Gelassenheit lies in its attempt to see
beyond the

K~tian

temporal horizon.

For Kant, every perception was informed by the intuition of time before being submitted to our understanding.
As a result., reason was placed under the aegis of time.

Time became . the supreme judge to which all human experience
was subject.

Although it is true that Kant sought contact

with the transcendent through the imperatives of the will.
still, time hung as a cloud over all man's endeavors.

No

thought of an absolute was possible, Since, by definition,
an absolute would be absolved from ail determinations (in'
this case) of time.

So mUQh

has lived under this curse.

of , con~emporary

philosophy

Man is seen as a creature with

'infini te aspirations yet finite sbili ties.

He can hope

limitlessly yet perform only finitely.
Gelassenheit has attempted to : break out of Kant's
temporal prison.
cess itself.

It seeks a source for the temporal pro-

And although this source 1s not named, because
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the point in .history has not arrived when it oan be named,
still Heidegger speaks of it in terms that .suggest its freedom from the determinations of time.

Thus, it is oalled the

free, the open, the undetermined, and said to be at rest •
•
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